Guardian Star
Review packet · 22 Nov 2026 · Unclassified

Files of record

The board

8 warnings · 27 watches · 1 open scored forecast (F1 / W7)

A warning is a next rung that has not occurred. A watch is a standing topic with a bar. Capabilities bound whether fired indicators can produce the outcome. Intent is usually the assumption; the files say so on each warning. Pre-defined indicators (W-n-Ix) are on the warning cards, not a separate log.

Warnings

Likelihood as of the board files. I / D = indicator count / disconfirming count. Open a row for the full card.

IDWarned outcomeLikelihoodWindowI / D
W1Russia opens a new ground axis in the northW1a roughly even chance low
W1b very unlikely low
through 2027-03-3111 / 3
W2Direct Russia–NATO military clashW2 very unlikely lowthrough 2027-03-319 / 2
W3PRC coercive military action against TaiwanW3a unlikely low
W3b very unlikely low
W3c very unlikely low
through 2027-12-3113 / 3
W4Sustained disruption of the advanced chip supply chainW4a unlikely low
W4b roughly even chance low
through 2027-12-318 / 2
W5Government restriction on open-weight AI models or local inferenceW5 unlikely lowthrough 2027-12-316 / 1
W6Iran/Gulf: dual-chokepoint energy cutoff, Iran–Saudi war, or NPT withdrawalW6a unlikely low
W6b unlikely low
W6c unlikely moderate
through 2027-12-3114 / 5
W7US diesel export embargoW7 unlikely moderatescored 30-day window closed 2026-10-23 PDT5 / 3
W8Successful terror attack on a Five Eyes/NATO FOL used in the Iran war, or a mass-casualty Islamist attack in Five EyesW8a unlikely low
W8b unlikely low
through 2027-03-316 / 3

Watches

No likelihood. Most days most of these produce nothing.

IDTopicBar (first test)
T1Ukraine warChange of control of an operationally significant town, line, or crossing, confirmed by geolocated evidence or by both sides.
T2Taiwan and the Western PacificTaiwanese domestic politics that change defense policy, budgets, or cross-Strait posture.
T3Semiconductor supply chainProcess-node, packaging, or memory milestones reaching volume production, or slipping, at any leading producer.
T4Significant AI eventsA capability result that is new in kind, with a reproducible evaluation or independent replication: sustained autonomous work, automated research and engineering, novel science,…
T5Quantum computingError correction: logical qubits below threshold at increasing code distance, logical gate operations, growth in logical qubit count, with a paper or data.
T6US/Israel–Iran war and the GulfChange in Hormuz commercial transits or in the blockade's scope, with a tracking source or an official order.
T7Arctic and northern maritime routesNew security, basing, or investment-veto agreements covering Greenland or other Arctic territory, with a text, a date, or a head-of-government announcement.
T8US homeland: immigration enforcement and legal-immigration policyA death in an ICE/CBP encounter or in an anti-ICE protest, or regular US armed forces deployed for immigration enforcement.
T9Korean PeninsulaFire across the Military Demarcation Line, or a DMZ/MDL incident with casualties that ROK JCS, MND, UNC, or USFK attributes as a hostile act.
T10Plausibly deniable industrial accidents (sabotage-team activity)A cluster: three or more such events in 30 days in one country, or three or more in 30 days against the same infrastructure class (energy, rail, ATC/telecom, ports, chemicals, u…
T11US–Canada trade ruptureCanadian oil or potash redirected to a third country (especially the PRC) as replacement for lost US share.
T12US Western Hemisphere cartel-military campaignAcknowledged US land combat in Mexico or Venezuela, or operations without host-nation consent.
T13Drone, TBM, and C-UAS capability developmentA named system, effector, or scale that is new for that actor: organic swarm, TBM C-UAS effector, CCA/loyal wingman, program-of-record fielding, or a stated inventory or product…
T14TCO kinetic/drone capability (Western Hemisphere)Government-acknowledged new class, scale, or effector for a named TCO: payload weight, FPV/OWA, RF-hopping or fiber, or lift at or above about 150 lb, with the actor's own relea…
T15Ethiopia-Tigray conflictChange of control of an operationally significant town, airport, line, or crossing, confirmed by geolocated evidence or by both sides (or by the losing party's own admission).
T16Sudan civil warChange of control of an operationally significant town, airport, line, or crossing — El Obeid, Kadugli, Dilling, Port Sudan, Khartoum, Nyala, Ed Damazine, or equivalent — confir…
T17Sahel JNIM / Islamic StateChange of control of a national capital or an operationally significant city or fuel/import corridor (Bamako, Ouagadougou, Niamey, Kayes, or a named Senegal/Côte d’Ivoire tanker…
T18Critical minerals and rare-earth supplyA signed corridor, offtake, or financing instrument that newly moves lithium, copper, rare earths, or magnets to Western markets, with a text.
T19Ukrainian government institutional integrityNABU, SAPO, SBU, or VAKS charging document, detention, or conviction of a sitting or just-departed (≤90 days) defense minister, DPA/DOT director, Commander-in-Chief or General S…
T20Russian government institutional integritySK or FSB charging, detention, or court of a sitting federal minister, deputy PM, presidential-administration deputy, or named silovik (FSB, NSO, Rosgvardiya, or MoD at deputy-m…
T21US action against Cuba's communist governmentA named US official product (White House, Pentagon, SOUTHCOM, Army Reserve, CIA, or State) stating Cuba as the operational requirement, or deployment orders to that requirement …
T22Islamist terrorism in Five Eyes and NATO EuropeCT-led explosives, firearms, or terrorism-statute arrests, or Army/EOD on vehicles, targeting or next to a named military facility, government site, or mass-casualty civilian ta…
T23France domestic unrestFrench armed forces deployed on metropolitan streets to restore order, or a nationwide état d’urgence / equivalent covering the unrest, with a government product.
T24Haiti: gangs and extra-regional interventionEl Salvador or the US acknowledges combat operations in Haiti beyond a hostage-rescue raid, with a government product.
T25Poland institutional dual-powerExtra-constitutional removal, detention, or blocking of the sitting president or prime minister from office, with a text or a date.
T26Industrial refrigeration / cold-chain ICS cyberA confirmed attack on a named US grocer, food distributor, or hospital blood bank that alters refrigeration setpoints or spoils inventory, with an operator, CISA, FBI, HHS, USDA…
T27US West Coast container-port labor disruptionAn ILWU work stoppage that idles cargo operations at the Port of Los Angeles or the Port of Long Beach, confirmed by PMA, the port, or a terminal operator.

Scored forecast

Time-bounded claims frozen at issuance. A warning’s live rung can move during the window; the scored card does not. Resolution is binary on the warned outcome inside the window.

Kyle 2026-09-23: W7 is the first real-world test of GUARDIAN STAR predictive capabilities. A miss at window close is a process failure, not “likely misses sometimes.” Miss → retool (after-action and framework changes in the same turn), not a log line and a lowered rung.

Open a card when a warning is issued at likely or higher with a window of 30 days or less, or when Kyle marks a call as scored. After F1 (2026-10-24): do not open a card on a straight adoption of FO “likely within N days” when the cabinet is split or the implementing secretary is on the record against the act. Haircut first (see references/scored-forecasts.md); score only if the GS rung after the haircut is still likely or higher.


Open

(none)


Resolved

F1 — W7 US diesel export embargo inside 30 days

Frozen: 2026-09-23 Claim: The US administration imposes a full or partial ban, embargo, or equivalent export restriction on diesel fuel by proclamation, IEEPA / DOE / Commerce order, or a completed floor vote (W7 warned outcome / W7-I4) on or before 2026-10-23. Issued likelihood: likely, moderate confidence Source of the call: FO Early Warning 23 Sep (R.C.), adopted as W7 Window: 2026-09-23 through 2026-10-23, America/Los_Angeles (FO 23 Sep: “likely within the next 30 days”; WARNINGS.md window). Hit: W7-I4 fires inside the window. Resolve immediately; do not wait for close. No retool from this test. Miss: 2026-10-23 ends without I4. Congressional calls, cabinet studies, the president’s urging, voluntary refiner cuts, SPR / heating-oil actions, and a gasoline-only restriction are not a hit. On miss (Kyle 2026-09-23): retool prediction frameworks. Apply W7-D3. Do not treat as within-error-bar. Write the after-action and the framework changes in the same turn (skill: scored-forecast resolution). Status: MISS Resolved: 2026-10-24 (window closed 2026-10-23 23:59:59 PDT; clock 2026-10-24 07:00 PDT). Kyle 2026-09-23 scored-test rule. What was checked (this run): - Federal Register API, presidential documents, publication 2026-09-20 through 2026-10-24: term diesel export ban OR embargo → count 0. Presidential diesel document in the window: EO 14435 “Emergency Tax Relief on Diesel Fuel” only (FR 2026-20855, published 2026-10-09; White House, 5 Oct, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/emergency-tax-relief-on-diesel-fuel ) — dyed-diesel tax/penalty relief, not an export restriction. - FR API diesel + export, same dates: LNG-plant authorizations (2026-10-20), SAFE Vehicles Rule III (2026-09-30), Safe Explosives Act (2026-09-25). None is a diesel-export restriction. - White House proclamations/actions indexes this session: JS shells; no diesel-export-ban instrument retrieved. - Congress.gov: H.R. 10423 (temporary prohibition on diesel-fuel export through 31 Dec 2026) and H.R. 10422 (Diesel Price Reduction Act of 2026) — both introduced 16 Sep 2026, referred to House Foreign Affairs, status Introduced; no floor vote (https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/10423 ; https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/10422 ). - Reuters, Bose/Psaledakis/Shakil, 2 Oct: Trump “will not authorize an export ban on diesel” after the G7 reserve release (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/trump-not-going-be-doing-diesel-export-ban-2026-10-02/ ). - Reuters, Renshaw/Douglas, 23 Oct: farm aid, dyed-diesel EO, Russian-fuel GL, European stock release; “a threat to restrict US diesel exports” as past pressure, not an imposed restriction; analysts “little diesel price relief before midterms” (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/trumps-diesel-price-relief-efforts-grow-costlier-election-nears-2026-10-23/ ). - INDICATORS.md: no W7-I4 tag this window. Weekend sweep 24 Oct already logged I4 unfired through close and left D3/F1 to this job. Instrument: none. W7-I4 unfired through 2026-10-23 PDT.

After-action (F1 miss — Kyle 2026-09-23 retool)

Assumption that failed: midterm diesel-price pressure would outweigh Wright/Burgum opposition and refiner pushback inside 30 days, so an executive restriction was likely.

FO’s R.C. versus what occurred: - 23 Sep: “a diesel export embargo is likely within the next 30 days” (adopted; W7 opened at likely; F1 frozen here). - 24 Sep: Wright’s “not considering a ‘flat ban’” read as imminent non-flat (GS likely → very likely). - 6 Oct: “almost certainly exhaust other options before resorting to a diesel export embargo” after the 5 Oct dyed-diesel EO (GS very likely → likely). - 14 Oct: “A U.S. diesel export embargo is increasingly unlikely ahead of the 2026 midterms” after DPA/Delek (GS likely → unlikely). Live rung was already off likely before close. - Occurred: no I4. Substitutes executed instead — G7/IEA stock release (2 Oct), dyed-diesel EO 14435 (5 Oct), OFAC GL 135 Russian-origin diesel import authorization (9 Oct), DPA/Delek Tyler expansion (13 Oct), NEHHOR heating-oil exchange (21 Oct). AAA national diesel 24 Oct $6.3374 versus series high $6.5276 on 22 Sep (https://gasprices.aaa.com ).

Should GS have opened at likely given a split cabinet? No. On 23 Sep the implementing secretary (Wright) was already public that a ban “definitely doesn’t work”; Burgum had said an export ban would not lower prices; Bessent was “examining”; Trump had urged staff. That is a split, not a decision path. Opening at likely was a straight adoption of FO’s time-bounded Outlook. The call should have opened at roughly even chance (FO wording still quoted; GS rung haircut one step for named opposition from the implementing secretary). F1 should not have been scored: after the haircut the GS rung would not have been likely.

What would have discriminated earlier: - Wright 23 Sep public rejection plus the White House denial of Politico’s 90-day blanket plan — held as not D1 (denial of a flat/blanket plan, not of any restriction). Correct on D1’s wording; insufficient as a rung haircut. - Trump, South Lawn, 2 Oct: “will not authorize an export ban on diesel” (Reuters). Held as a Wright-class hedge on “the export ban” / flat ban, not D1, because FO 24 Sep imminent was unretracted. That over-parsed a dated presidential “no” to keep FO’s time-bounded likely. D1’s wording (“a dated ‘no’ from the president”) was met. The live rung should have dropped on 2 Oct without waiting for FO 6 Oct / 14 Oct.

Retool applied this turn: analysis skill, FO ingest reference, and this register. FO still wins on wording until Kyle says otherwise. Time-bounded likely adoption is no longer automatic when the cabinet is split.

Source files