Capabilities

What each actor can do, and for non-military warnings what makes an outcome feasible or buffers against it. Capabilities bound whether fired indicators can produce a warned outcome. Every entry is sourced on one line and carries an as-of date; an entry older than its subject’s rate of change is stale and says so.

Entry format:

### <Actor>: <capability>
**As of:** <date> · **Bears on:** <warning IDs>
**Assessment:** what the actor can do, concretely.
**Source:** who, how they know, date, URL.
**Gaps:** what is unknown.

---

Ukraine

Ukraine: long-range strike into the Moscow region

As of: 2026-09-20 · Bears on: none yet Assessment: Demonstrated ability to hit an oil-industry facility and a logistics facility in the Moscow region in one overnight strike. Zelenskyy lists the systems used as FP-1, RZ-100, MICH-2000, Palianytsia, Vendetta, Liutyi, Bars, Flamingo, Sichen, and Pelican, in a joint operation by the SBU, Unmanned Systems Forces, SOF, Defense Intelligence, and Foreign Intelligence Service. Source: Zelenskyy, official statement, 20 Sep 2026, https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2101574761440583973 · both facility hits verified by Kyle 20 Sep 2026. Gaps: Which systems reached which targets. Strike volume and interception rate. Sustainable tempo. The system list is the claimant’s own.

Ukraine: northern defenses

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W1 Gaps: Fortification depth and obstacle belts in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts. Reserves available to the north. Needs sourcing.

Ukraine: plausibly deniable sabotage teams

As of: 2026-09-21 · Bears on: T10 Assessment: Kyle assesses Ukrainian sabotage teams as real and active. Method is plausible deniability. A single official-accident account is not itself a demonstration. Source: Kyle, instruction, 21 Sep 2026 (this session). Not independently sourced this session. Gaps: Targeting set and tempo outside the war zone. Public baseline.

Russia

Russia: uncommitted operational reserve

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W1 Gaps: Size and location of formations not committed to active fronts. Force generation rate against loss rate. Needs sourcing.

Russia: northern logistics

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W1 Gaps: Rail and depot capacity through Bryansk oblast; access to Belarusian rail. Needs sourcing.

Russia: forces available opposite NATO

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W2 Gaps: Ground, air, and naval forces in the Leningrad Military District and Kaliningrad while committed in Ukraine. Needs sourcing.

Russia: plausibly deniable sabotage teams

As of: 2026-09-21 · Bears on: W2 (I3, I9), T10 Assessment: Kyle assesses Russian sabotage teams as real and active. Method is plausible deniability: public accident, neglect, or equipment- outage accounts often cannot discriminate. A single such account is not itself a demonstration. Source: Kyle, instruction, 21 Sep 2026 (this session). Not independently sourced this session. Gaps: Order of battle, targeting set, tempo. No public baseline of industrial-accident rates against which to judge “abnormal.”

Russia: layered air defense around Moscow

As of: 2026-09-20 · Bears on: none yet Assessment: Zelenskyy says Russia is building “layered rings of air defense” around Moscow “at the expense of other regions.” A claim by an adversary with an interest in making it; uncorroborated here. Source: Zelenskyy, official statement, 20 Sep 2026, https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2101574761440583973 Gaps: Independent confirmation. Which regions were thinned.

Russia: strike UAV against western Ukrainian passenger rail near the Polish border

As of: 2026-09-20 · Bears on: T1 (no W1/W2 indicator as worded) Assessment: On 13 Sep 2026 a Russian jet-propelled drone struck the locomotive of a passenger train at Yahodyn, ~2 km from Poland. Passengers had been evacuated; no casualties. Ukrzaliznytsia said a diplomatic train carrying YES-conference returnees had left early and the drone “quite possibly” targeted it; former CIA director Petraeus was on another train at the station. Russia said it struck western Ukrainian “railway infrastructure.” Demonstrates a UAV strike on passenger rail at a NATO-adjacent crossing. Intent to hit the diplomatic train is the railway operator’s “quite possibly,” not an established fact. Source: BBC, 13 Sep 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy5zg41dkqwo (Zelensky, Ukrzaliznytsia, Polish authorities, Bildt, Johnson) · ISW, 13 Sep 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026 Gaps: Weapon type beyond Ukrzaliznytsia’s “jet-propelled drone.” Whether the diplomatic train was the aimed target.

Belarus

Belarus: ground forces readiness and size

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W1b Gaps: Combat-ready strength, equipment state, and mobilization capacity. Whether the late-August readiness inspection changed posture. Needs sourcing.

NATO

NATO: eastern-flank air defense and rules of engagement

As of: 2026-09-23 · Bears on: W2 Assessment: Baltic Air Policing fighters can be activated on a Latvian yellow (“possible air threat”) cell broadcast without a confirmed entry (NBS, Krāslava, 21 Sep 2026 evening; warning ended in under two hours, no shoot-down claimed). Poland can put military aviation into its own airspace and raise ground AD/radar to readiness as a standing preventive procedure during Russian air attacks on Ukraine, then stand them down; on 21 Sep DORSZ stated no Polish airspace violation was observed. On 23 Sep DORSZ reported a Russian Armed Forces Mi-8 entered Polish airspace north of Braniewo from Kaliningrad (~300 m, 42 seconds, 11:08 CEST); radar tracked it, fighters were scrambled, ground AD/assets stayed on standby, no engagement claimed. That is a scramble against a confirmed crewed entry, not only the preventive posture of 21 Sep. LSM’s 21 Sep context recap of 2026 Latgale incidents: BAP has shot down at least two drones in Latvian airspace this year (French fighters, 8 Jun; BAP, 14 Aug, later identified as a Ukrainian UAV that entered from Belarus). Those prior intercepts remain the demonstrated engagement record; 23 Sep was detection and scramble without engagement. Source: DORSZ, 23 Sep 2026, https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/2102723364439679215 · PAP via Bankier, 23 Sep, https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Rosyjski-smiglowiec-naruszyl-przestrzen-powietrzna-Poderwano-mysliwce-9201440.html · NBS, 21 Sep 2026, https://x.com/Latvijas_armija/status/2102113008269115500 and https://x.com/latvijas_armija/status/2102113919858823226 · LSM, 21 Sep, https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/21.09.2026-izsludinats-iespejamais-gaisa-telpas-apdraudejums-kraslavas-novada.a647785 · DORSZ, 21 Sep, https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/2102118929368051882 and https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/2102143044682494049 · RCB, 21 Sep, https://x.com/RCB_RP/status/2102123025865048563 Gaps: Written ROE for a 42-second crewed violation vs uncrewed intruders; whether the scrambled fighters reached the track before the helicopter exited; land vs water at Braniewo; which BAP nation scrambled on 21 Sep; how often yellow warnings fire without a track. National differences beyond LV/PL.

Russia–NATO: deconfliction channels

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W2 Gaps: Which military-to-military channels exist and are answered. Needs sourcing.

PRC

PRC: plausibly deniable sabotage teams

As of: 2026-09-21 · Bears on: T10 (not a W3 required input as worded) Assessment: Kyle: he would be shocked if Chinese teams were not active. That is an assumption, not a demonstration. Method, if present, is the same plausible deniability. Source: Kyle, instruction, 21 Sep 2026 (this session). Not independently sourced this session. Gaps: Whether the teams exist as an operational program. Targeting set.

PRC: reusable orbital spaceplane (CSSHQ / “Shenlong”)

As of: 2026-09-20 · Bears on: none yet Assessment: Operates at least one winged reusable orbital vehicle — official name 可重复使用试验航天器 (“reusable experimental spacecraft”); “Shenlong” is Western usage from a 2000s sub-scale test article. Four Long March 2F/T launches from Jiuquan: Sep 2020 (2 days), Aug 2022–May 2023 (276 days), Dec 2023–Sep 2024 (267 days), and Feb 7 2026–present (in orbit ~225 days as of 20 Sep 2026; prior endurance record 276 days). Demonstrated: runway recovery at Lop Nur airfield, Xinjiang; sub-satellite deployment on each of the first three missions and again 22 Jun 2026 (LeoLabs detection, catalogued by US Space Force); rendezvous/proximity operations with objects it released; orbit-raising from ~340 km to ~590–600 km. Secure World Foundation (Jun 2026): has not approached non-Chinese space objects; near-zero feasibility as an orbital strike weapon; best understood as reusable-spaceflight testing, hardware experimentation, risk reduction. Separately, Haolong-1 (AVIC Chengdu cargo shuttle for Tiangong, design revealed Nov 2024) is in development and has not flown — it is the vehicle mistaken for a “first spaceplane” in 20 Sep 2026 social posts. Commercial-imagery reporting (single source) shows rapid expansion at Lop Nur airfield (new runway, facilities), consistent with a growing test cadence. Source: SWF fact sheet, Victoria Samson & Emily Kunasek, 12 Jun 2026, https://www.swfound.org/publications-and-reports/chinese-reusable-experimental-spacecraft-fact-sheet · SpaceNews mission log, https://spacenews.com/chinas-secretive-reusable-spaceplane-lands-after-267-days-in-orbit · LeoLabs deployment (22 Jun 2026) via Space.com and china-in-space.com, Sep 2026 · Haolong-1: Space.com, Nov 2024 · Lop Nur expansion: Misbar commercial-imagery report, 3 Sep 2026, single source. Gaps: Whether a recovered airframe has actually been reflown (reuse is the program’s premise but is unconfirmed; fleet size unknown). Payload capacity and mission purposes. Mission 4 landing date — no landing notices found as of 20 Sep 2026. The one spacecraft-to-spacecraft photo (Maxar/Vantor, shown at a USSF Korea event Nov 2024) may or may not show this vehicle.

PRC: extra-extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicles (XXLUUV) and mothership

As of: 2026-09-21 · Bears on: W3 (mechanism: long-range uncrewed undersea combat; Sutton’s West Coast minelaying/pinning scenario is an analyst assessment, not demonstrated employment. Not a required input as W3 is currently worded — W3a/b/c still rest on lift, quarantine capacity, and Taiwan/US posture) Assessment: Two competing XXLUUV hulls, ~35 m and ~45 m, have been observed on trials around Hainan (Gangmen Harbour west of Sanya, and Yinggezui), housed and launched from specialized floating docks including 专用浮船坞001 (launched CSSC Guangxi, Oct 2024). Sutton: sailless, X-form stern; first publicly noted Jan 2025; uncrewed assessment from how they are housed. A separate, smaller XLUUV family (AJX002 minelayers and HSU100) appeared at the 2025 Beijing parade (eight hulls). New this cycle: a surface hull under construction at Hudong-Zhonghua, Shanghai, assessed by Sutton from satellite imagery as a purpose-built mothership — stern well-deck open below, cradle on 12 jack-up arms, enclosed hangar he estimates at four XXLUUVs. Demonstrated: large uncrewed submarine-sized vehicles on sea trials from Hainan docks; a specialized support hull under construction. Not demonstrated: operational deployment, combat payload on the trial hulls, mothership at sea, or West Coast reach. Range (~10,000 nm) and torpedo/mine load are Sutton’s Dec 2025 reading of a defence-show conceptual model, not a published PLAN spec. PLAN has not named the program. Source: H I Sutton, Naval News, Sep 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/09/chinas-new-giant-submarine-drone-mothership · Sutton, Naval News, Sep 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/09/china-moves-two-super-sized-xxl-uncrewed-submarines-to-south-china-sea/ · Sutton, Naval News, Dec 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/12/chinas-new-underwater-drones-could-threaten-west-coast-u-s/ · Taiwan News citing Vantor via The Telegraph, 20 Sep 2026, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6443214 Gaps: Official designation, operator, and whether either XXLUUV wins a production tender. Independent view of the Shanghai imagery this session (Sutton’s assessment; Vantor named only via Telegraph/Taiwan News). Hull length of the mothership (~205 m in secondary Defence Security Asia / Interesting Engineering copy — not in the Sutton piece retrieved). Real range, payload, and autonomy. Whether the mothership is PLAN combatant or a trials tender.

PRC: containerized VLS on merchant hulls

As of: 2026-09-21 · Bears on: W3 (mechanism: extra anti-ship/land-attack magazine from dual-use hulls in a Taiwan fight. Covert CONUS-port or coastal-box launch is a homeland-pinning scenario, not a W3 required input as worded) Assessment: Two layers. Do not weld them. (1) Overt fit, Christmas 2025: photos of a medium civilian-basis container feeder in Shanghai with containerized VLS, containerized sensors, Type-1130 CIWS, Type-726 decoys, and a large rotating array. TWZ counts 60 cells (5×3 containers × 4 tubes); Naval News counts at least 48 (3 rows of 16) and independently placed the hull in Shanghai by satellite. Missile type unconfirmed (YJ-18 / CJ-10 / YJ-21 / HHQ-9 are lists, not IDs). TWZ: layout looks “photo ready”; open whether proof-of-concept or mockup; combat system integration unknown. CIWS and fire-control radar make this the opposite of a disguised merchant. (2) Covert concept: CSIS (Apr 2024) records a March 2019 report that a YJ-18C land-attack variant was being designed to deploy in commercial shipping containers — the Club-K analogue. Demonstrated: a Chinese civilian-basis hull publicly fitted with container VLS and warship sensors, satellite-confirmed in Shanghai. Not demonstrated: live fire from that hull, a production conversion line, or a covert launch from an unmarked box on a trading ship. US MK-70 (SM-6 from USS Savannah) and Russian Club-K are the same class of idea; the Chinese photos are the furthest along as a full-ship fit. Source: Tyler Rogoway, The War Zone, 25 Dec 2025, https://www.twz.com/sea/chinese-cargo-ship-packed-full-of-modular-missile-launchers-emerges · Ethan Gossrow, Naval News, Dec 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/12/container-ship-turned-missile-battery-spotted-in-china · CSIS Missile Threat, YJ-18 (YJ-18C note), 23 Apr 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/yj-18 Gaps: Hull identity (ZHONG DA 79 is secondary, not in TWZ/Naval News). Live fire. Whether cells are GJB 5860-2006. Scale beyond one feeder. YJ-18C status after the 2019 report.

PRC: amphibious and airborne lift

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W3b, W3c Gaps: Naval lift, civilian ferry augmentation, airborne capacity, and how much can be concentrated undetected. Needs sourcing.

PRC: capacity to sustain a quarantine

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W3a Gaps: Coast guard, maritime militia, and navy hulls available for sustained interdiction; rotation depth. Needs sourcing.

PRC: control of critical-mineral processing

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W4b Gaps: Share of processing by input; licensing regimes in force; buyer inventories. Needs sourcing.

DPRK

DPRK: plausibly deniable sabotage teams

As of: 2026-09-21 · Bears on: T10 (not a T9 required input as worded) Assessment: Kyle assesses North Korean sabotage teams as active. Method is plausible deniability. A single official-accident account is not itself a demonstration. Source: Kyle, instruction, 21 Sep 2026 (this session). Not independently sourced this session. Gaps: Targeting set, especially outside the peninsula. Public baseline.

Taiwan

Taiwan: energy, food, and munitions reserves

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W3a Gaps: Days of supply by category, especially LNG. Needs sourcing.

Taiwan: defenses and mobilization

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W3 Gaps: Anti-ship and air-defense inventories, reserve readiness. Needs sourcing.

United States and allies

United States: strategic munitions inventory after Operation Epic Fury

As of: 2026-06-30 (Lead IG report posted 2026-09-09) · Bears on: W6a; mechanism into W3 (stocks committed to the Gulf are not available for a Western Pacific contingency) Assessment: The Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment told the Lead IG that munitions expenditure in Operation Epic Fury “has resulted in strategic inventory shortfalls and revealed industrial base bottlenecks for munitions resupply.” Mitigation (streamlined procurement, stockpiles, allied offset of drawdowns) has begun; expanding production still requires “significant lead time.” Most persistent bottlenecks: solid rocket motors. DoW estimated OEF cost $33.4 billion as of 29 Jun 2026, of which $22.3 billion was expended munitions. Demonstrated: the Iran war has already drawn US strategic munitions below stated requirements, with an industrial-base lag before refill. Source: Lead Inspector General, Operation Epic Fury, Report to Congress, April 1, 2026–June 30, 2026, posted 9 Sep 2026, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Sep/09/2003993626/-1/-1/1/OEF_Q3_JUN2026_FINAL_508%20SECURE.PDF · FO Early Warning 21 Sep 2026 (R.C. assessment). Gaps: Which munitions classes, by how many. Current (Sep 2026) inventory versus the 30 Jun cutoff. Interceptor stocks specifically (adjacent AP reporting on Saudi air-defense ask). Whether the shortfall is large enough to constrain a Taiwan contingency.

United States: LUCAS / FLM-136 one-way attack drone

As of: 2026-09-20 · Bears on: T6, T13 (no W-indicator) Assessment: US-built Shahed-136-family one-way attack drones (LUCAS combat; FLM-136 target/test) have been used in Operation Epic Fury since 28 Feb 2026. A delta-wing airframe recovered by a Pensacola charter in the Eglin Gulf Test Range on 19–20 Sep is assessed by TWZ as that family; Eglin confirmed a test article went down and did not identify it. FO’s M.H. assesses LUCAS. Source: The War Zone, 20–21 Sep 2026, https://www.twz.com/air/shahed-136-clone-found-by-florida-fisherman-eglin-afb-admits-it-lost-a-drone · FO Early Warning 21 Sep 2026. Gaps: Official identification of the recovered airframe. Current production rate and inventory after OEF expenditure.

United States: C-UAS against massed small-UAS (Scarlet Dragon 26-3 experiment)

As of: 2026-09-21 · Bears on: T13 (no W-indicator) Assessment: XVIII Airborne Corps Scarlet Dragon 26-3 (Fort Bragg, 11–17 Sep 2026) combined soldiers, industry, AI, EW, radar, autonomous systems, and defensive fires against UAS threats. Corps story: some scenarios featured swarms of up to 100 unmanned aircraft as a threat replica. Corps Facebook: more than 25 sensor types feed a shared air picture. DVIDS: mass presentations of 25 to 100 drones “designed to overwhelm sensors and stress software and air defense crews simultaneously.” Col. Rob Kenny (fires): “there’s no one sensor to rule them all.” Demonstrated at exercise scale: the Contingency Corps can stage 25–100 small-UAS swarms as Red and run a layered C-UAS experiment (Sentinel tracks, AH-64 profiles, acoustic sensors, portable radar, industry effectors). Not demonstrated: a named program-of-record C-UAS kit, a published intercept rate against a 100-drone saturation, TBM C-UAS, or combat employment of this architecture. Planned, not held: Scarlet Dragon 27-1 (Apr 2027) and Summit Strike at Fort Drum (Sep 2027); Defense Daily interview grafs add TBM effectors and offensive counter-launcher fires for those events. Source: XVIII Airborne Corps courtesy story, DVIDS Story ID 575267, 21 Sep 2026, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/575267/americas-contingency-corps-trains-against-drone-threat-next-war · Department of War news, https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4608907/americas-contingency-corps-trains-against-drone-threat-prepares-for-future-batt · XVIII Airborne Corps Facebook, 18 Sep 2026, https://www.facebook.com/18abn/posts/the-threat-exists-we-must-adaptxviii-airborne-corps-is-advancing-counter-uas-cap/1510399554455003 · Defense Daily interview grafs, Cal Biesecker with Staeheli/Monaghan, 16 Sep 2026, https://www.defensedaily.com/scarlet-dragon-26-3-interview-with-col-paul-staeheli-g3-xviii-airborne-corps-and-col-tom-monaghan-director-joint-innovation-outpost/army (rest paywalled this session) Gaps: Named effectors and kill rate. Whether 100 aircraft flew simultaneously or were a staged presentation. Offensive UAS types in the war.gov “evaluated new UAS platforms for offensive tactical operations” caption. Whether 2027 TBM C-UAS is a stated requirement or a reporter’s paraphrase.

United States: legal authority to restrict petroleum-product exports

As of: 2026-09-23 · Bears on: W7 Assessment: Roll Call (22 Sep) reads IEEPA as allowing the president to impose diesel-export restrictions without a congressional vote; the House is adjourned for the midterm campaign and the Senate is expected to leave within a week, so a floor path is not available inside FO’s 30-day window. Prior US practice is against fuel-export bans (AFPM: “administrations from both parties have repeatedly opted against”). Demonstrated as legal-commentary plus political path, not as an order in force. Not demonstrated: a proclamation, DOE/Commerce rule, or IEEPA notice this cycle. Source: Roll Call, 22 Sep 2026, https://rollcall.com/2026/09/22/trump-says-administration-is-weighing-diesel-export-restrictions · Politico, 22 Sep 2026, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/09/22/trump-decision-diesel-export-ban-soon-01087925 · FO Early Warning 23 Sep 2026 (R.C.). Gaps: Confirm IEEPA vs EPCA vs existing DOE export-control authorities against the statute. Whether renewable diesel or existing contracts would be covered. Duration and destination exemptions.

United States: secondary-sanctions threat sufficient to ground Iranian carriers at third-country airports

As of: 2026-09-23 · Bears on: T6 (no W6 indicator as worded) Assessment: Treasury Secretary Bessent said Monday that Iranian airlines would be shut down on 23 Sep by the threat of secondary sanctions on air- services providers: fuel, landing services, or ticket sales knock the provider out of the dollar system (CNBC via Reuters/Al Jazeera). Iraq ordered its CAA to suspend Iranian flights to Baghdad from Wednesday midnight (two unnamed Reuters sources); Iranian CAO (Tasnim) cancelled Tehran–Baghdad and Muscat; ISNA: Iranian travelers not admitted at Oman’s airport. Demonstrated as a threat that moved Iraq and Oman/Muscat before the stated 23 Sep date. Not demonstrated: a published OFAC notice this session, or Azerbaijan (FO’s, uncorroborated here). Source: Reuters, 22 Sep 2026, two unnamed sources, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-suspends-iranian-flights-baghdad-after-us-sanctions-threat-sources-say-2026-09-22 · Al Jazeera, 22 Sep 2026, citing Tasnim/ISNA, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/22/iran-flights-to-baghdad-muscat-cancelled-ahead-of-us-aviation-sanctions · FO Early Warning 23 Sep 2026. Gaps: OFAC primary. Whether Najaf diversion proceeds. Duration.

United States: Locust HEL C-UAS against cartel UAS (RGV)

As of: 2026-09-23 · Bears on: T13 (no W-indicator) Assessment: RGV Sector Chief Patrol Agent Jared Ashby told NewsNation the US military used AeroVironment Locust high-energy lasers mounted on JLTVs to shoot down 11 “cartel-linked” drones in the Rio Grande Valley since late August. Ashby: Border Patrol uses jammers; the military runs the laser under Department of War authorities. NewsNation, citing military officials: roughly 75% drop in RGV detections after deployment; 300 drones “defeated” along the southern border this year, including 100 in August. Ashby: agents recently found a cartel-linked drone in the RGV capable of carrying a payload. Demonstrated as the sector chief’s claim: HEL C-UAS intercepts against drones the government says cartels use to surveil agents and guide smugglers. Not independently demonstrated: locations, engagement circumstances, or verification of each of the 11. Source: Ali Bradley, NewsNation, retrieved 23 Sep 2026, https://www.newsnationnow.com/us-news/immigration/border-coverage/drones-laser-weapons-rio-grande-valley/ · Ashby, named official, exclusive interview in that piece Gaps: Department of War primary not retrieved. Whether Locust is program-of-record. Airframe class of the payload-capable find. Independent intercept confirmation.

US and Japan: forward posture and stated commitments

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W3 Gaps: Forces in theater, access agreements, declaratory policy. Needs sourcing.

US and allies: control of chip tools, design software, and servicing

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W4b Gaps: Controls in force, enforcement record, servicing dependencies. Needs sourcing.

Western Hemisphere TCOs

Designated Mexican cartels: ISR and payload-capable UAS

As of: 2026-09-22 · Bears on: T14 (no W-indicator; T12 is the US campaign, not TCO capability) Assessment: Unnamed US and Mexican officials described to WaPo (22 Sep) an internal US assessment that Latin American drug cartels are upgrading drones faster than counternarcotics defenses. Restated claims: ISR on both sides of the border; at least one cartel has a six-to-eight-rotor aircraft for hours-long flight carrying more than 150 pounds (Mexican intel document WaPo reviewed; not independently verified); studying RF hopping / anti-jam; recruiting Colombians with Ukraine combat experience and sending affiliates on one-year contracts, with skills expected in use within months. Ashby (named, RGV): payload-capable cartel-linked drone found in the sector; drones used to surveil agents and guide migrant groups remotely. Demonstrated at named-official layer: ISR employment and at least one payload-capable airframe recovered. The 150-lb class, Ukraine pipeline, and RF-hopping remain unnamed-official via WaPo; WaPo body not retrieved this session. Source: The Washington Post, 22 Sep 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/09/22/us-assessment-warns-drug-cartels-alarming-drone-advances (body not retrieved; WaPo’s own post https://x.com/washingtonpost/status/2102397651064959078 · Newsmax restatement via Yahoo, 22 Sep, https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/articles/cartels-tap-ukraine-war-drone-120659751.html) · Ashby via NewsNation, retrieved 23 Sep 2026, https://www.newsnationnow.com/us-news/immigration/border-coverage/drones-laser-weapons-rio-grande-valley/ Gaps: Named TCO. Independent verification of the 150-lb class. Ukraine MoD (Palianytsia) says few arrivals have criminal intent. Whether “cartel-linked” in the laser intercepts means operator, payload, or inferred origin.

Iran and the Gulf

Iran-aligned forces: anti-shipping strike capability in the Strait of Hormuz

As of: 2026-09-17 · Bears on: W6a Assessment: Since the war began in late February 2026, Iran and affiliated forces have struck commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, the Strait, and the Gulf of Oman often enough that JMIC describes projectile risk to AIS-broadcasting transiting vessels as an established “status quo”: 72 incidents on commercial vessels through 28 Aug (UANI count); a 14 Sep strike killed one crew member; the US declared mines removed 25 Aug while JMIC still reported active mine-danger areas 27 Aug; IRGC hailing and diversion pressure pushes traffic onto the Iranian-controlled northern route. Effect: open transits collapsed from ~138/day pre-war to single digits, with partial recovery under the Islamabad MoU (peak 54/day, 24 Jun). Demonstrated: the capability to keep a 33 km-wide waterway effectively closed to normal commercial traffic for ~6.5 months against a US naval presence and blockade — the same closure that Xeneta and Drewry data tie to Asia–US container rates near pandemic records. Source: JMIC Advisory Note Update 097, 17 Sep 2026, https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-097-jmic-advisory-note-17-september.pdf · incident counts and transit figures: UANI, 28 Aug 2026, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/analysis/iran-shipping-update-august-28-2026 (advocacy source) · CENTCOM blockade totals via Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 9 Sep 2026 · 13–14 Sep strike: Iran International, 13 Sep 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609138535 Gaps: Attribution of individual strikes — no projectile strike has been publicly attributed. Iranian weapon inventory and stockpiles (ASCM, USV/UAV, mines). Whether the closure is deliberate Iranian policy or the cumulative effect of risk. Sustainability under blockade. Houthi anti-shipping reach in the Red Sea is a parallel capability, not covered here.

United States: naval blockade of Iranian ports

As of: 2026-09-14 · Bears on: W6a Assessment: CENTCOM enforces a blockade of maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports and coastal areas, not of the Strait itself; it says it continues to support traffic not violating the blockade. First period 13 Apr–18 Jun 2026 (CENTCOM: >140 compliant vessels redirected, 9 non-compliant disabled, >50 humanitarian-aid vessels passed). Resumed 14 Jul 2026 at 1600 ET “at the Commander in Chief’s direction.” Demonstrated: the US can halt Iran-bound/Iran-origin commercial traffic in the Gulf of Oman and Hormuz approaches while claiming not to close the strait to third-country transits. Source: CENTCOM public release, 14 Jul 2026, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4542098/us-forces-to-resume-naval-blockade-against-iran Gaps: Current cumulative intercept totals after 14 Jul (secondary figures exist; not in this CENTCOM notice). Legal characterization is a party claim, not assessed here. Whether Combined Maritime Forces plays any enforcement role (CENTCOM frames this as a US operation).

Ansar Allah (Houthis): anti-shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb

As of: 2026-09-12 · Bears on: W6a, W6b Assessment: Declared a blockade of Saudi ports 20 Jul 2026. Demonstrated hits on Saudi-linked tankers (AMZAN, 24 Aug, UANI/JMIC-adjacent reporting) and, per four Yemeni-government sources to Reuters, seizure of Perim island on 11 Sep. Spokesperson Yahya Saree said navigation remained safe except for Saudi vessels. Parallel to, not the same as, the Hormuz anti-shipping capability. Source: Reuters, 12 Sep 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudis-shut-down-oil-pipeline-houthis-tighten-grip-red-sea-shipping-2026-09-12 · Houthi claims of tanker hits via NYT/Al Jazeera, Aug 2026 Gaps: Remaining missile/USV inventory. Whether Perim seizure is independently confirmed beyond the four Yemeni-government sources. Command relationship with Tehran is a disputed claim; do not treat alignment as proven direction.

Saudi Arabia: East–West pipeline as a Hormuz bypass

As of: 2026-09-22 · Bears on: W6a Assessment: The 1,200 km Petroline (Abqaiq–Yanbu) has been the main remaining outlet for Saudi crude while Hormuz traffic is reduced. Reuters, 12 Sep: it had been moving 4–5 million b/d (4–5% of global supply) before a 10–11 Sep drone/missile attack on a pumping station south of Medina; Saudi Arabia shut the line as a precaution (Reuters 22 Sep dates the shut to 13 Sep). Baghdad and Riyadh said the drones originated in Iraq; Trump said Iran was “probably” to blame; no group claimed the pipeline strike in that Reuters piece. Earlier 2026 hits were followed by a return to full capacity (Al Jazeera, 12 Apr 2026). On 22 Sep three unnamed sources told Reuters operations had restarted at a “low rate” and Yanbu loadings could resume that day; Aramco did not comment. Demonstrated: the bypass can be brought back from a mid-September shut within about two weeks, at least at low rate (FO’s M.H.). Not demonstrated this cycle: throughput ≥2 million b/d held. Bounds W6a: if the bypass is down, the 30-day dual-cutoff clock can run; if it holds above 2 million b/d, W6a is harder. Source: Reuters, 12 Sep 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudis-shut-down-oil-pipeline-houthis-tighten-grip-red-sea-shipping-2026-09-12 · Reuters, 22 Sep 2026, three unnamed sources, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-arabia-restarts-east-west-oil-pipeline-resume-exports-yanbu-sources-say-2026-09-22/ · FO Early Warning 22 Sep 2026 (M.H. assessment) Gaps: Actual barrels per day as of 22 Sep. Repair vs bypass-around-damage. Yanbu export ceiling under Houthi Red Sea pressure. Aramco has not confirmed.

United Kingdom: air-to-air refuelling of Saudi aircraft on claimed defensive missions

As of: 2026-09-21 · Bears on: T6 (not W6-I9 as worded) Assessment: Prime Minister Andy Burnham told reporters 21 Sep he had agreed the night before, on Streeting/Miliband advice, to a Saudi request for “defensive air-to-air refuelling.” UK officials: one RAF Voyager from Akrotiri, starting in days, time-limited to weeks, supporting Saudi aircraft defending against drones and missiles rather than strikes on Houthis. Additional to Sky Sabre already in the kingdom (Metro; Al Jazeera). Demonstrated: London will put a tanker on a claimed defensive Saudi AD task. Not demonstrated: UK strikes in Yemen this cycle, or combat against Iran. Source: Burnham to reporters en route UNGA, 21 Sep 2026, via BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqlykpe4dk0yo · AP, https://apnews.com/article/britain-saudi-arabia-yemen-burnham-c736f6485b0e9293eee733e12adc9bcd · PA via Al Jazeera, 22 Sep, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/22/uk-to-refuel-saudi-jets-to-help-counter-houthi-attacks Gaps: Whether the Voyager has actually launched. How “defensive” is policed if Saudi sorties mix CAP and strike. Duration beyond the first weeks.

Iran: Artesh Ground Forces presence on land borders and the Makran coast

As of: 2026-09-20 · Bears on: T6 (no W6 indicator as worded) Assessment: NEZAJA commander Brig. Gen. Ali Jahanshahi says the bulk of army ground-force units sit on the northwest, west, southwest, east, northeast and southeast borders, “especially on the Makran coast,” including special forces, rapid-reaction, special-operations, mechanised and artillery units, and that this posture predates the US-Israeli war and is offered as deterrence against a ground attack. Four days earlier he put “around 10” brigades on the Makran coast and the Gulf of Oman. Demonstrated only as the commander’s claim through state media; no independent brigade count or movement imagery this session. Source: Jahanshahi via Mehr, 20 Sep 2026, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/247913/Army-ground-forces-deployed-across-Iran-s-borders · Jahanshahi via Fars, 16 Sep 2026, https://farsnews.ir/TM_911/1789558519445114250 Gaps: Actual strength and whether the “10 brigades” is new or restated. IRGC vs Artesh split on the Hormuz-facing coast. Independent confirmation of movement.

Iran: legal capacity to withdraw from the NPT

As of: 2026-09-20 · Bears on: W6c Assessment: Iran is an NPT party. Article X withdrawal is a political/legal act available to any party. IAEA GOV/2026/50 (1 Sep 2026) reports the Agency cannot verify nuclear material or enrichment; inspectors were withdrawn for safety. On 20 Sep MP Haji Deligani said a triple-urgency withdrawal bill had been submitted to the Majlis presiding board and awaited the speaker (Mehr); Rezaei said the nuclear-weapons fatwa still held. Formal withdrawal (notice or enacted statute) is still unused. IAEA blindness is already in force, so the monitoring consequence of a notice is smaller than the political one. Source: IAEA GOV/2026/50, 1 Sep 2026, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2026-50.pdf · Haji Deligani via Mehr, 20 Sep 2026, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/247902/NPT-withdrawal-bill-submitted-to-parliament-presiding-board · Iran International, 20 Sep 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609209403 Gaps: Speaker has not been retrieved accepting the 20 Sep triple-urgency bill onto an open session (Haji Deligani via Mehr says it sits with the presiding board). Timeline from notice to effective date under Article X (three months in the treaty text — confirm against the filed notice if one appears).

Systems

Semiconductor supply chain: geographic concentration

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W4a Gaps: Share of leading-edge logic, HBM, and advanced packaging by location; capacity entering production elsewhere. Needs sourcing.

Semiconductor supply chain: inventories and substitutes

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W4 Gaps: Buffer stocks and qualified alternatives for each chokepoint input. Needs sourcing.

Governments: authority and enforceability over model weights

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W5 Gaps: Existing legal authority in the US, EU, and PRC to restrict weights or inference hardware; enforceability against weights already distributed. Needs sourcing.

Open-weight ecosystem: capability gap to the closed frontier

As of: unassessed · Bears on: W5 Gaps: Current gap on independent evaluations; what runs on consumer-class hardware. Needs sourcing.