Warnings

The scenarios we warn on. Each warning defines its indicators in advance, names the capabilities the warned outcome requires (entries in CAPABILITIES.md), and carries a current likelihood. Observations that fire indicators are logged in INDICATORS.md, tagged like W1-I3.

For military warnings a capability is what an actor can do. For economic, technical, and regulatory warnings it is whatever makes the outcome feasible or buffers against it: concentration, inventories, substitutes, legal authority. Warnings can drive each other; links are noted under the warning (W3 → W4).

A warning moves when its likelihood changes rung. History is the warning’s provenance: record every rung move and every change to its outcome, window, indicators, or required capabilities, each with the date, what changed, and the source that drove it (observation, publication and issue date, URL, or Kyle’s instruction).

Likelihood ladder: almost no chance · very unlikely · unlikely · roughly even chance · likely · very likely · almost certainly

Time-bounded calls at likely or higher with a window of 30 days or less are also frozen as scored forecasts in FORECASTS.md. The live rung can move; the card does not.

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W1 — Russia opens a new ground axis in the north

Warned outcome: Russian ground forces begin sustained offensive operations across the border into Chernihiv, Sumy, or Kharkiv oblast on an axis that is not active today. Sustained means held territory and committed maneuver units, as opposed to raids by sabotage-reconnaissance groups.

Window: through 2027-03-31 (the source report says “winter”).

Variants - W1a, Russia alone: from Bryansk, Kursk, or Belgorod oblast. - W1b, joint with Belarus: Belarusian territory used as a launch area, with or without Belarusian units crossing. Higher consequence: it lengthens the front by several hundred kilometers and threatens the Kyiv approaches.

Current likelihood (set 2026-09-20, provisional) - W1a: roughly even chance, low confidence. - W1b: very unlikely, low confidence.

Basis: one single-source report resting on unnamed “Russian military circles” (OSINTWarfare, 26 Aug 2026), plus background that needs sourcing: Russia has opened northern axes before in this war, and Belarusian entry has been predicted repeatedly since 2022 without occurring. The source rates W1b above W1a; the base rate points the other way. Nothing in CAPABILITIES.md yet supports either judgment, which is why confidence is low.

Assumption to state in every assessment: intent. Even with capabilities assessed and indicators fired, visible preparation in the north is equally consistent with fixing Ukrainian reserves there without attacking.

Indicators

Force posture - W1-I1 New Russian formations identified in Bryansk, Kursk, or Belgorod oblast beyond border-cover levels, especially units moved from active fronts. - W1-I2 Offensive engineering and sustainment moved forward: bridging equipment, breaching of own border obstacles, field hospitals, fuel and ammunition depots. - W1-I3 Belarusian readiness activity: snap inspections, personnel recalls, units leaving garrison, movement toward the southern border. (W1b) - W1-I4 Russian ground forces deploying into Belarus, including under cover of announced exercises. (W1b)

Shaping - W1-I5 Strike campaign concentrating on northern logistics, bridges, and air defense in Chernihiv, Sumy, or Kharkiv oblast. - W1-I6 Rising cross-border sabotage-reconnaissance activity on a quiet sector. - W1-I7 Airspace closures, border-zone civilian restrictions, or evacuations on the Russian or Belarusian side.

Political and information environment - W1-I8 Unannounced or unusually frequent Putin–Lukashenko meetings. Weak: many explanations. (W1b) - W1-I9 Pretext narratives: claims of Ukrainian or NATO provocation on the Belarusian border, “buffer zone” rhetoric aimed at a new sector. Assess coordination, attribution, and purpose as three separate judgments. - W1-I10 Third-party signals: government warnings, embassy advisories, reported proposals for localized ceasefires covering quiet northern sectors.

Defender behavior - W1-I11 Ukrainian reserves moved north, new fortification, evacuation orders in border districts. Shows Kyiv’s assessment, not Moscow’s intent.

Disconfirming - W1-D1 Units in the northern grouping redeployed to active fronts. - W1-D2 Belarusian units return to garrison; inspection formally closed. - W1-D3 Ground-freeze period passes with no accumulation under I1–I2.

Required capabilities

• Russia: uncommitted operational reserve large enough for a new axis while sustaining current fronts. (W1a, W1b)
• Russia: northern logistics through Bryansk and, for W1b, Belarusian rail.
• Belarus: ground forces readiness and size. (W1b with Belarusian units)
• Ukraine: northern defenses. Fortification depth, obstacle belts, and available reserves. Bounds whether an attack produces a breach.
• Terrain and season. Polesia marsh and forest restrict maneuver; frozen ground widens it. Consistent with a winter window.

History

• 2026-09-20: warning opened on Kyle’s scenario, citing OSINTWarfare (26 Aug 2026, https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2092737723782045743). Outcome, indicators, capabilities, and initial rungs drafted by Claude; rungs rest on that single-source report plus unsourced background.

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W2 — Direct Russia–NATO military clash

Warned outcome: Russian and NATO-member regular forces deliberately fire on each other’s crewed platforms, personnel, or territory, and at least one government acknowledges it as deliberate. Interception of uncrewed systems over NATO territory, sabotage, and jamming fall below this line; they are indicators.

Window: through 2027-03-31.

Current likelihood (set 2026-09-20, provisional): very unlikely, low confidence. Basis: background that needs sourcing. Years of incidents below the line have not crossed it, and both sides have shown an interest in keeping it that way. Nothing in CAPABILITIES.md bears on it yet.

Assumption to state in every assessment: that both sides still want to stay below the line. An incident can cross it without either side intending to.

Indicators

• W2-I1 Uncrewed or crewed Russian aircraft entering NATO airspace, with rising frequency, depth, or payload.
• W2-I2 A NATO member shoots down a crewed Russian aircraft, or Russia fires on a NATO crewed platform.
• W2-I3 Sabotage of NATO-state infrastructure (undersea cables, pipelines, rail, depots) attributed to Russia by a government.
• W2-I4 Article 4 consultations requested; Article 5 language used by a head of government.
• W2-I5 Russian force generation opposite the Baltic states, Finland, or the Suwalki corridor; Kaliningrad reinforcement.
• W2-I6 NATO forces deploying into Ukraine, or a NATO member announcing an air-defense role over Ukrainian territory.
• W2-I7 Russian statements naming a specific NATO member or facility as a legitimate target; matching pretext narratives (assess coordination, attribution, and purpose separately).
• W2-I8 Interference with Baltic or Black Sea shipping by either side: boardings, escorts, closures.
• W2-I9 A cluster of plausibly deniable industrial or critical- infrastructure accidents in NATO states at an abnormal rate: three or more in 30 days in one NATO country, or three or more in 30 days against the same class (energy, rail, ATC/telecom, ports, chemicals, undersea cables) across NATO territory. Official per-event wording of accident, construction damage, equipment outage, or neglect does not block this fire. A single event does not fire it. Government attribution of one event still fires I3, not this. Kyle 2026-09-21: this rate is a classic signal that sabotage teams are active; plausible deniability is the method.
• W2-D1 New or restored deconfliction channels; incident followed by visible restraint from both capitals.
• W2-D2 Ceasefire or armistice in Ukraine taking effect.

Required capabilities

• Russia: forces available opposite NATO while committed in Ukraine.
• NATO: eastern-flank air defense and rules of engagement.
• Both: deconfliction channels. A buffer; its absence raises the risk that an incident escalates.
• Russia: plausibly deniable sabotage teams (filed 2026-09-21; Kyle). Bounds I3/I9 only as a method; the W2 outcome still requires acknowledged deliberate fire.

History

• 2026-09-20: warning opened at Kyle’s request for this topic. Outcome, indicators, capabilities, and initial rung drafted by Claude from unsourced background that predated the project’s knowledge of the 2026 US/Israel–Iran war; treat the rung as a placeholder until sourced.
• 2026-09-21: W2-I9 added on Kyle’s instruction (plausibly deniable industrial accidents at an abnormal rate as a sabotage-team signal). W2-I3 unchanged (still needs government attribution). Rung holds. The 21 Sep Newark/PHL TRACON Amtrak fiber cut is n=1 toward I9, not a fire.
• 2026-09-23: W2-I1 fired (DORSZ: Russian Mi-8 entered Polish airspace north of Braniewo, ~300 m / 42 s, 11:08 CEST; fighters scrambled, ground AD on standby, no engagement claimed; https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/2102723364439679215). W2-I2 did not fire. Rung holds at very unlikely: this is below the line (no acknowledged deliberate fire on crewed platforms, personnel, or territory). Depth/duration this instance are shallow; PAP says Russian aviation had not recently been violating Polish airspace.
• 2026-09-23: Jedlanka rail obstruction logged (KPP Łuków / Lublin prosecutor: Art. 173 KK, preliminary hooliganism; WarMonitor3 remix of 23 Sep). W2-I3 unfired (no named-state attribution). W2-I9 unfired (single deliberate-obstruction incident, not an accident cluster; Newark remains n=1). Rung holds.

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W3 — PRC coercive military action against Taiwan

Warned outcome, by variant - W3a, quarantine or blockade: PRC coast guard or military forces interdict or turn back commercial traffic to Taiwan’s main ports for more than 72 hours. - W3b, outlying island seizure: PRC forces land on or take control of Kinmen, Matsu, Pratas, or Itu Aba. - W3c, invasion: PRC strikes on Taiwan proper or an amphibious or airborne assault on the main island.

Named exercises that end on schedule fall below the line; they are indicators.

Window: through 2027-12-31.

Current likelihood (set 2026-09-20, provisional): W3a unlikely; W3b very unlikely; W3c very unlikely. All low confidence. Basis: background that needs sourcing, and stale. Nothing in CAPABILITIES.md bears on it yet.

Assumption to state in every assessment: intent and timing rest on Beijing’s private cost judgment, which exercises and rhetoric reveal poorly. Large exercises are also rehearsal, signalling, and cover; the same observation supports all three readings.

Links: W3 → W4. Any W3 variant is a direct cause of W4a.

Indicators

Military - W3-I1 Exercises around Taiwan growing in scale, duration, or proximity; exercises announced without an end date; live fire inside the 24 nm zone. - W3-I2 Amphibious lift, civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries, and landing craft concentrating in Eastern Theater Command ports. - W3-I3 PLA Rocket Force dispersal; air and naval units surged forward from other theater commands. - W3-I4 Coast guard and maritime militia boardings or inspections of Taiwan-bound vessels; patrols inside Kinmen or Matsu restricted waters. - W3-I5 Maritime or airspace closure notices covering Taiwan’s approaches.

Mobilization and sanctions-proofing - W3-I6 Reservist call-ups, blood drives, field-hospital preparation, leave cancellations in the PLA. - W3-I7 Strategic stockpiling of fuel, food, and critical inputs; outbound restrictions on the same. - W3-I8 Financial insulation: reserve reallocation away from Western assets, capital controls, guidance to state firms on overseas exposure. - W3-I9 PRC advising its nationals to leave Taiwan, or restricting travel there.

Political, information, and grey zone - W3-I10 Legal or doctrinal steps: Anti-Secession Law invoked, new jurisdiction claims over the Strait, deadlines stated for “reunification.” - W3-I11 Subsea cable cuts near Taiwan or its outlying islands; cyber operations against Taiwan’s power, finance, or communications. - W3-I12 Pretext narratives aimed at a specific Taiwanese or US act (assess coordination, attribution, and purpose separately).

Third parties - W3-I13 US, Japanese, or Philippine force movements or evacuation advisories; war-risk insurance repricing for the Strait; carriers and airlines rerouting.

Disconfirming - W3-D1 Exercise forces return to home ports and bases on schedule. - W3-D2 Resumed cross-Strait or US–PRC military dialogue. - W3-D3 A favorable weather window (roughly April and October) passes without I2 or I6.

Required capabilities

• PRC: amphibious and airborne lift sufficient for the variant. (W3b, W3c)
• PRC: capacity to sustain a quarantine with coast guard, militia, and navy against escort attempts. (W3a)
• Taiwan: energy, food, and munitions reserves. Bounds how long W3a takes to bite.
• Taiwan: defenses and mobilization.
• US and Japan: forward posture and stated commitments.
• United States: strategic munitions inventory after Operation Epic Fury (filed 2026-09-21). A bound, not a required input to a PRC action: Gulf expenditure with industrial-base lag reduces stocks available for a Western Pacific contingency.

History

• 2026-09-20: warning opened at Kyle’s request for this topic. Outcome, indicators, capabilities, and initial rung drafted by Claude from unsourced background that predated the project’s knowledge of the 2026 US/Israel–Iran war; treat the rung as a placeholder until sourced.
• 2026-09-21: Lead IG OEF report (OUSW(A&S): strategic inventory shortfalls and industrial-base bottlenecks from munitions expenditure; posted 9 Sep, period through 30 Jun) filed as a US capability that bounds W3. No W3 indicator fired this period. Rungs hold. FO Early Warning 21 Sep (R.C.): administration expanding the defense industrial base “in anticipation of a U.S.-China crisis as soon as 2027.”
• 2026-09-21: PRC XXLUUV / mothership capability filed (Sutton, Naval News Sep 2026; Hainan trials 2025; Hudong-Zhonghua hull under construction). No W3 indicator fired. Rungs hold. Kyle: CCP capability note, https://x.com/JWUpacific/status/2102156919335211365.
• 2026-09-21: PRC containerized-VLS-on-merchant-hulls capability filed (TWZ / Naval News Dec 2025 Shanghai feeder; YJ-18C still a 2019 development report). Kyle: consider with XXLUUV. No W3 indicator. Rungs hold.

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W4 — Sustained disruption of the advanced chip supply chain

Warned outcome, by variant - W4a, output loss: leading-edge logic or high-bandwidth memory output available to the market falls materially for 30 days or more, from any cause: conflict, disaster, utility failure, facility incident. - W4b, chokepoint restriction: a government restricts a chokepoint input, tool, or service (rare earths, gallium, germanium, lithography tools or their servicing, photoresist, specialty gases, substrates) and at least one major producer announces production cuts or allocation because of it.

Announced controls with no production effect fall below the line; they are indicators.

Window: through 2027-12-31.

Current likelihood (set 2026-09-20, provisional): W4a unlikely; W4b roughly even chance. Both low confidence. Basis: background that needs sourcing: export controls and counter-controls have escalated repeatedly in recent years, mostly without reaching the production-cut line.

Assumption to state in every assessment: that governments calibrate controls to stop short of hurting their own industries. Miscalibration is how W4b happens.

Links: W3 → W4a.

Indicators

• W4-I1 New export controls, entity listings, or licensing regimes on chips, tools, or inputs, by the US, PRC, Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan.
• W4-I2 Retaliation announced or signalled in response to I1.
• W4-I3 Licenses for a chokepoint input slowed or denied in practice, reported by buyers.
• W4-I4 Fab outage or yield loss at a leading-edge site, confirmed by the operator.
• W4-I5 Earthquake of roughly M6.5 or greater near Hsinchu, Taichung, or Tainan; typhoon damage; water or power rationing affecting science parks.
• W4-I6 Contract or spot prices, or lead times, moving abnormally for leading-edge wafers, HBM, DRAM, or advanced packaging.
• W4-I7 Force majeure declarations, allocation notices, or inventory hoarding by major buyers.
• W4-I8 Any fired W3 indicator that touches shipping, insurance, or power.
• W4-D1 Licenses resumed or controls suspended by agreement.
• W4-D2 Material new leading-edge or packaging capacity entering production outside Taiwan.

Required capabilities

• Supply chain: geographic concentration of leading-edge logic, HBM, and advanced packaging.
• Supply chain: inventories and substitutes for each chokepoint input.
• PRC: control of critical-mineral processing.
• US and allies: control of tools, design software, and servicing.

History

• 2026-09-20: warning opened at Kyle’s request for this topic. Outcome, indicators, capabilities, and initial rung drafted by Claude from unsourced background that predated the project’s knowledge of the 2026 US/Israel–Iran war; treat the rung as a placeholder until sourced.

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W5 — Government restriction on open-weight AI models or local inference

Warned outcome: the US, EU, or PRC adopts a binding rule that restricts publishing, distributing, or running open-weight models above a capability or compute threshold, or that licenses the hardware needed to run them locally. Voluntary commitments and proposed bills fall below the line; they are indicators.

Window: through 2027-12-31.

Current likelihood (set 2026-09-20, provisional): unlikely, low confidence. Basis: background that needs sourcing, and stale in a field that moves monthly.

Assumption to state in every assessment: that no triggering incident occurs. A single attributed misuse event could move this by several rungs quickly.

Indicators

• W5-I1 Bills, executive actions, or agency rulemakings that name model weights, open release, or compute thresholds.
• W5-I2 Export-control rules extended to model weights or to consumer-class accelerators.
• W5-I3 A serious incident (cyber, biological, financial, infrastructure) attributed by a government to an open-weight model.
• W5-I4 Major labs or industry groups lobbying for release restrictions, or reversing their own open-release policies citing risk.
• W5-I5 Hosting platforms removing or gating model weights under legal pressure.
• W5-I6 Government evaluations reporting dangerous-capability thresholds crossed by a released open-weight model.
• W5-D1 Statute, ruling, or policy affirming open release; rules adopted with explicit open-weight exemptions.

Required capabilities

• Governments: legal authority to regulate weights or inference hardware under existing law.
• Governments: enforceability against weights already distributed.
• Open-weight ecosystem: capability gap to closed frontier models. A small gap raises the perceived stakes of open release.

History

• 2026-09-20: warning opened at Kyle’s request for this topic. Outcome, indicators, capabilities, and initial rung drafted by Claude from unsourced background that predated the project’s knowledge of the 2026 US/Israel–Iran war; treat the rung as a placeholder until sourced.

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W6 — Iran/Gulf: dual-chokepoint energy cutoff, Iran–Saudi war, or NPT withdrawal

The war that began on 28 Feb 2026 is the baseline, not the warned outcome. T6 covers its course. This warning is the next rungs: a sustained cutoff of the remaining Gulf energy outlets, a declared Iran–Saudi war, or formal NPT withdrawal.

Warned outcome, by variant - W6a, sustained dual-chokepoint cutoff: for 30 consecutive days, commercial transits of the Strait of Hormuz remain below 25% of the ~138/day pre-war JMIC baseline and either (i) the Saudi East–West pipeline (Petroline) / Yanbu route moves less than 2 million barrels per day, or (ii) Bab el-Mandeb is closed to commercial tankers of any flag. Named 72-hour outages and Saudi-only Houthi targeting fall below the line; they are indicators. - W6b, Iran–Saudi direct war: Iranian regular forces (IRGC or Artesh) and Saudi regular forces deliberately fire on each other’s territory, crewed platforms, or personnel, and at least one government acknowledges it as deliberate. Houthi–Saudi fighting, and strikes launched from Iraqi territory, fall below this line; they are indicators. - W6c, NPT withdrawal: Iran deposits an Article X notice of withdrawal from the NPT, or the Majlis enacts a binding withdrawal statute. Rhetoric, committee discussion, and IAEA access denial fall below the line.

Window: through 2027-12-31.

Current likelihood (set 2026-09-21, provisional) - W6a: roughly even chance, low confidence. - W6b: unlikely, low confidence. - W6c: unlikely, moderate confidence.

Basis: the war is 6.5 months old; Hormuz traffic is already a fraction of the pre-war baseline (JMIC Update 097, 17 Sep 2026); the US naval blockade of Iranian ports has been in force since 14 Jul (CENTCOM public release); Petroline, which Reuters reported on 12 Sep had been moving 4–5 million b/d as the main Hormuz bypass, was shut as a precaution after a 10–11 Sep drone/missile attack that Baghdad and Riyadh said originated in Iraq (Reuters later dated the shut itself to 13 Sep). As of 22 Sep, three unnamed sources told Reuters the line had restarted at a “low rate” and Yanbu loadings could resume that day; Aramco did not comment. Throughput is not confirmed at or above 2 million b/d, so W6-D2 is not met and W6-I4 remains fired. Houthis declared a blockade of Saudi ports on 20 Jul and, per four Yemeni-government sources to Reuters (12 Sep), seized Perim island in Bab el-Mandeb; Houthi spokesperson Saree said navigation remained safe except for Saudi vessels. That combination is why W6a is not “unlikely”: two of the three remaining outlets are already impaired, and a 30-day dual cutoff is a duration test on a condition that may already have begun. It is not “likely” because Aramco restored Petroline after earlier 2026 hits (Al Jazeera, 12 Apr 2026) and because Houthi targeting is still described by the group as Saudi-only. W6b: President Pezeshkian said “We are not at war with Saudi Arabia”; Riyadh has not acknowledged firing on Iran; Saudi asked Washington for help against the Houthis and, per Reuters (12 Sep), was told the US would not intervene directly for now. W6c: IAEA GOV/2026/50 (1 Sep 2026) states the Agency cannot verify nuclear material or enrichment; Iranian lawmakers have raised withdrawal (Iran International, 13 Sep) and two National Security Committee members said no withdrawal bill had been submitted. Access is already gone, which lowers the practical gain from a formal notice. W6-I11 fired 20 Sep on a lawmaker’s claim that a triple-urgency withdrawal bill sits with the Majlis presiding board (Haji Deligani via Mehr); that is a bill, not enactment.

Assumption to state in every assessment: that Tehran prefers to fight Saudi Arabia through Iran-aligned groups rather than as a declared co-belligerent, and that Washington prefers not to open a Saudi front. Either preference can change. Who “closed” the Strait, whether the blockade is lawful, and the stated casus belli of 28 Feb are claims by parties; they are not this warning’s outcome.

Links: W6a → energy prices and LNG supply (Qatar’s Ras Laffan sits inside the Gulf). T6 notes a possible mechanism into W3 (US naval forces committed to the Gulf; Taiwan LNG) and W4 (energy and specialty-gas supply to fabs). State the mechanism each time; do not treat an oil-price move as a W4 fire.

Indicators

Maritime and energy (W6a) - W6-I1 JMIC/UKMTO or equivalent reporting Hormuz commercial transits remaining below 25% of the ~138/day pre-war baseline, or the threat level at SEVERE with attacks on commercial shipping assessed as likely. - W6-I2 Projectile, mine, or uncrewed-vessel attacks on commercial ships in the Strait, the Persian Gulf, or the Gulf of Oman. - W6-I3 Attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb, or a change of control at Perim, Mocha, or other points that dominate the strait. (Also shapes W6b.) - W6-I4 East–West pipeline (Petroline) or Yanbu terminal damaged, shut, or under attack; official or satellite confirmation that throughput is below 2 million b/d. - W6-I5 A second Gulf producer (UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar) loses its remaining export route or declares force majeure on crude or LNG. - W6-I6 War-risk or P&I cover withdrawn for Gulf or Red Sea transits; third-party naval escorts withdrawn. - W6-I7 IEA or a major consumer announces a strategic-reserve release, allocation, or rationing tied to Gulf supply.

Iran–Saudi (W6b) - W6-I8 Iranian regular forces strike Saudi territory, or Saudi regular forces strike Iran; government acknowledgment. - W6-I9 Saudi request for, or receipt of, direct third-party combat intervention against Iran (not against Houthis only). - W6-I10 Closure of Iraq–Iran or Iraq–Saudi crossings after strikes launched from Iraqi territory; Baghdad attributing those strikes to Iranian direction.

Nuclear (W6c) - W6-I11 Majlis bill on NPT withdrawal; Article X notice; official statement that withdrawal has been decided. - W6-I12 IAEA Board finding or UNSC action on non-compliance; Iranian statement that safeguards obligations have ended.

Political and information - W6-I13 Collapse or revival of a written US–Iran instrument (the Islamabad MoU of 17 Jun 2026 is the precedent); named concessions or named breaches. - W6-I14 Pretext narratives aimed at a specific Saudi, US, or Iranian act (assess coordination, attribution, and purpose separately).

Disconfirming - W6-D1 Hormuz transits recover toward the pre-war baseline; JMIC threat level reduced. - W6-D2 Petroline or Yanbu restarted at or above 2 million b/d and held. - W6-D3 A new US–Iran ceasefire or memorandum taking effect, with blockade lift and mine-clearance underway. - W6-D4 IAEA inspectors returned to declared sites. - W6-D5 Houthi–Saudi ceasefire that restores Red Sea energy traffic.

Required capabilities

• Iran-aligned forces: anti-shipping strike capability in the Strait of Hormuz (filed 2026-09-21).
• United States: naval blockade of Iranian ports (filed 2026-09-21).
• Ansar Allah (Houthis): anti-shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb (filed 2026-09-21).
• Saudi Arabia: East–West pipeline as a Hormuz bypass (filed 2026-09-21). Bounds W6a: if the bypass is up, dual-cutoff is harder; if it is down, duration is the remaining test.
• Iran: legal capacity to withdraw from the NPT. Article X notice is a political act; the IAEA already reports it cannot verify (GOV/2026/50). Bounds W6c only as a legal step, not as a restoration of monitoring.
• United States: strategic munitions inventory after Operation Epic Fury (filed 2026-09-21). Bounds W6a only as a US sustainment constraint; the dual-cutoff outcome does not require it. Mechanism into W3: stocks expended in the Gulf are not available for a Western Pacific contingency.

History

• 2026-09-21: warning opened. Initial likelihoods as above. Opened with W6-I1, W6-I3, and W6-I4 already in a fired state (Hormuz at wartime-reduced transits; Perim seizure claimed 11–12 Sep; Petroline shut since 11 Sep). Those fires set the W6a rung; they do not themselves meet the 30-day dual-cutoff outcome. W6b and W6c have no fired indicators at opening.
• 2026-09-21: W6-I2 fired (UKMTO-quoted inbound Hormuz tanker struck by an unknown projectile, two crew minor injuries, vessel continuing; Seatrade Maritime, 21 Sep). W6a rung holds — still a duration test on Hormuz plus Petroline, not a single-day attack. Lead IG OEF report (posted 9 Sep; period through 30 Jun) filed as a US munitions-inventory capability; does not move W6.
• 2026-09-21: W6-I11 fired (Hossein Ali Haji Deligani via Mehr, 20 Sep: triple-urgency NPT withdrawal bill “submitted to parliament’s presiding board” awaiting the speaker; Iran International same day carries his urging, not speaker acceptance). W6c rung holds at unlikely — indicator is a claimed bill, not Article X or an enacted statute. Rezaei same weekend: fatwa still in force, doctrine unaltered. The 13 Sep “no bill submitted” committee line is superseded as a claim.
• 2026-09-22: Petroline restart reported (Reuters, 22 Sep, three unnamed sources; Aramco silent; pumping “at a low rate”; Yanbu loadings “could resume” 22 Sep). FO Early Warning 22 Sep (M.H.): repair-within-two-weeks data point; additional strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure “probable in the next 90 days.” W6-D2 not met (not ≥2 million b/d and held). W6-I4 remains fired. W6a holds at roughly even chance, low confidence. No new Hormuz transit recovery (W6-D1) this session.
• 2026-09-23: FO Early Warning 23 Sep — Iraq/Oman cancel Iranian flights under a US secondary-sanctions threat (Reuters unnamed sources + Tasnim CAO; Azerbaijan uncorroborated this session). Does not fire W6-I13. No Aramco Petroline figure this session; W6-D2 still not met. W6a/b/c hold. W7 opened separately on FO’s diesel Outlook (not a W6 move).

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W7 — US diesel export embargo

The Gulf-war price shock is the baseline (T6). This warning is the next rung: a US restriction on diesel (and, if bundled, gasoline) exports.

Warned outcome: the US administration imposes a full or partial ban, embargo, or equivalent export restriction on diesel fuel by proclamation, IEEPA / DOE / Commerce order, or a completed floor vote. Congressional calls, cabinet feasibility studies, and the president’s public urging fall below the line; they are indicators.

Window: through 2026-10-23 (FO 23 Sep: likely within 30 days). FO’s R.C.: if imposed to mitigate prices, it will almost certainly come ahead of the 3 Nov 2026 election.

Scored as: F1 (FORECASTS.md). Kyle 2026-09-23: first real-world test of GS predictive capabilities. Miss at window close → retool, not a quiet expiry.

Current likelihood (set 2026-09-23): likely, moderate confidence.

Basis: FO Early Warning 23 Sep (R.C.) — “a diesel export embargo is likely within the next 30 days.” 22 Sep R.C. had been “remains likely to attempt all other options first”; FO moved. Factual premise: Trump at UNGA 22 Sep told reporters “I’ve called for it within my people” (Reuters/Politico); Bessent the same appearance said the administration is examining whether a full or partial ban would work; Sen. Sullivan joined Grassley/Hinson/Rogers; Senate Majority Leader Thune last week said an export ban “honestly makes probably more sense”; Energy Secretary Wright and Interior Secretary Burgum have publicly opposed; the House is adjourned for the midterm campaign (Roll Call: IEEPA as a no-Congress path). AAA national diesel $6.5276 as of 22 Sep, listed as the series high. No proclamation or floor vote. Confidence is moderate because the cabinet is split and refiners (API, AFPM) oppose; it is not low because the president has now publicly urged it.

Assumption to state in every assessment: that midterm diesel-price pressure outweighs Wright/Burgum and refiner opposition inside the 30-day window. FO’s M.H.: start and end dates will almost certainly trigger stockpiling by large industrial and commercial buyers; hospitals, emergency-response fleets, harvest agriculture, and critical freight will likely face increased supply volatility if a ban is enacted. FO’s R.C.: any embargo will likely only temporarily mitigate prices; once it expires, foreign buyers will almost certainly buy at record levels again.

Links: T6 covers the Gulf-war energy market and the diesel-restriction bar (admin action or floor vote). W6a is a driver of the price shock, not this outcome. State the mechanism each time; a pump-price print is not a W7 fire.

Indicators

• W7-I1 The president or a cabinet secretary publicly urges or supports a diesel or gasoline export restriction.
• W7-I2 A named official says the administration is examining the feasibility of a full or partial ban.
• W7-I3 A congressional majority-party call for an embargo, or a floor vote scheduled.
• W7-I4 Proclamation, IEEPA / DOE / Commerce order, or completed floor vote imposing a restriction. (The outcome.)
• W7-I5 Refiner run-cuts, allocation notices, or SPR / Northeast-heating-oil actions tied to an export restriction.

Disconfirming - W7-D1 An explicit White House decision against a ban, or a dated “no” from the president. - W7-D2 The national diesel retail average falls materially without a restriction. - W7-D3 Wright/Burgum opposition prevails and no order issues past the 30-day window.

Required capabilities

• United States: legal authority to restrict petroleum-product exports (filed 2026-09-23). Roll Call’s reading is IEEPA without Congress; House adjournment makes a floor path unavailable this window. Bounds whether I4 can occur as an executive act.

History

• 2026-09-23: warning opened from FO Early Warning 23 Sep (R.C.): likely within 30 days; almost certainly ahead of the 2026 election if imposed to mitigate prices. Initial rung likely, moderate confidence. Already-fired I1 (Trump, UNGA, 22 Sep, Reuters/Politico), I2 (Bessent, same appearance), I3 (Grassley 20 Sep; Sullivan 22 Sep; Thune exploring). Those fires set the rung; they do not meet the outcome. I4 unfired. T6 diesel-restriction bar unchanged (still admin action or floor vote).
• 2026-09-23: scored as F1 on Kyle’s instruction: first real-world test of GS predictive capabilities. Window close without I4 is a miss and a retool trigger, not within-error-bar. Hit if I4 fires on or before 2026-10-23. Resolution cron 2026-10-24 07:00 PDT; resolve immediately on an I4 fire.